Calvin University

Calvin Digital Commons
University Faculty Publications

University Faculty Scholarship

12-1-2007

Human identity, immanent causal relations, and the principle of
non-repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the bodily resurrection
Christina Van Dyke
Calvin University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/calvin_facultypubs
Part of the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Van Dyke, Christina, "Human identity, immanent causal relations, and the principle of non-repeatability:
Thomas Aquinas on the bodily resurrection" (2007). University Faculty Publications. 547.
https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/calvin_facultypubs/547

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Faculty Scholarship at Calvin Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Calvin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dbm9@calvin.edu.

Religious Studies 43, 373–394 f 2007 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0034412507009031 Printed in the United Kingdom

Human identity, immanent causal relations,
and the principle of non-repeatability : Thomas
Aquinas on the bodily resurrection
CHRISTINA VAN DYKE
Department of Philosophy, Calvin College, 350 Hiemenga Hall, 3201 Burton SE,
Grand Rapids, MI 49546

Abstract: Can the persistence of a human being’s soul at death and prior to the
bodily resurrection be suﬃcient to guarantee that the resurrected human being is
numerically identical to the human being who died? According to Thomas Aquinas,
it can. Yet, given that Aquinas holds that the human being is identical to the
composite of soul and body and ceases to exist at death, it’s diﬃcult to see how he
can maintain this view. In this paper, I address Aquinas’s response to this objection
(Summa Contra Gentiles, IV.80–81). After making a crucial clariﬁcation concerning
the nature of the non-repeatability principle on which the objection relies, I argue
that the contemporary notion of immanent causal relations provides us with a way
of understanding Aquinas’s defence that renders it both highly interesting and
philosophically plausible.

According to Thomas Aquinas, a human being is identical not to her soul,
but rather to the physical composite of soul and body.1 In fact, Aquinas holds that
a human being is necessarily a composite of matter and form – a claim that
commits him to the position that no human being could exist without a body.2
Since substance dualism is generally taken to entail that human persons could
exist apart from bodies,3 he thus appears to advocate a version of dualism interestingly diﬀerent from a Cartesian-style substance dualism.4 Indeed, Aquinas
argues explicitly against substance dualism and claims instead that only the
hylomorphic composite of body and soul constitutes one, complete substance.5
As he writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles [hereafter SCG], ‘ The soul and the
body are not two actually existing substances, but from these two things one
actually existing substance is made ’ (II.69).6
Aquinas’s rejection of a traditional substance dualism prevents his account
from falling prey to the traditional problems associated with that position. His
373
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proposed alternative faces its own troubles, however – troubles raised in large
part by Aquinas’s insistence that the human soul survives the death of the body
and that it persists in separation from matter until the bodily resurrection.
Aquinas advocates the Christian doctrine that there will be a resurrection
of bodies at the end of earthly life. This doctrine has two main claims : (1) at
the end times, God will resurrect all the human beings who have ever lived ; and
(2) resurrection will involve those human beings ’ possessing physical bodies of
some sort.
In this paper, I focus on the particular problem death (and the subsequent
resurrection of the body) raises for Aquinas’s account of human identity.
In its simplest form, the question is this: Can the persistence of an individual
human being’s soul at death and prior to the bodily resurrection be suﬃcient
to guarantee that human’s numerical identity to the resurrected human being ?7
If a human being, say, David, is identical not with his soul but with the
composite of soul and body, then at death David ceases to exist, even if his soul
persists.8 In this case, how can God later resurrect someone numerically identical
to David ?
Aquinas recognizes the need to address the diﬃculty the bodily resurrection
poses for human identity and in this he is not alone. Much recent work in
philosophical theology has been aimed at constructing an account of personal
identity that can accommodate the doctrine of the bodily resurrection without
appeal to a Cartesian brand of substance dualism.9 More broadly, contemporary
thought-experiments involving brain-state transfer devices and defective transporters raise essentially the same question of ‘ gappy’ existence and personal
identity. Can the very same human being who ceased to exist at time t be brought
back at time tk?
Many philosophers believe that the correct answer to this question is ‘ No ’.
I begin this paper by addressing one particularly pointed argument Aquinas
considers in SCG, IV.80 against the possibility that the resurrected human being
can be numerically identical with the original human being. In short, the objection rests on the principle that no natural thing can be corrupted and then restored with numerical identity – what I’ll call the principle of non-repeatability.
In his article ‘ Aquinas on continuity and identity ’, Christopher Hughes argues
that Aquinas should simply reject this principle and that he concedes too much in
adopting it in his reply.10 I believe, however, that Hughes misinterprets the importance of the principle’s mention of ‘natural things’. In fact, when it’s understood correctly, it seems that the principle does hold in the case of living
organisms.
Moreover, in responding to the objection, Aquinas appears to overstate both
the problem and his solution in a way that makes his position appear : (1) philosophically unattractive, and (2) puzzling, since the account of human nature
Aquinas has already provided prior to IV.80 leaves a more plausible response to
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the objection ready to hand. In the second half of this paper, I provide an outline
for such a plausible response. In short, I suggest that, although the disembodied
human soul is not identical to the human being, Aquinas is able to claim that
the soul’s persistence guarantees the persistence of relevant immanent causal
connections between the human being pre-death and post-resurrection –
connections which can, in fact, ground the identity of the human being at death
and through the bodily resurrection.

The resurrection of the body

The problem of ‘ gappy’ existence is raised for Aquinas by the Christian
doctrine of bodily resurrection, which Aquinas understands to involve the reunion of the rational soul with matter after a period of separation at death.
Aquinas believes that he has philosophical as well as theological reasons to advocate this doctrine ; as we’ll see, his general theory of human nature leads him to
posit a bodily resurrection as opposed to the continued existence of disembodied
souls in the afterlife.
Indeed, Aquinas presents several arguments in SCG, IV.79 in defence of the
claim that ‘ the resurrection of bodies will come through Christ ’,11 all of which rely
on the further belief that it goes against the human soul’s very nature to exist
apart from matter.12 In his ﬁrst philosophical argument in chapter 79 in support of
the bodily resurrection, for example, Aquinas appeals to the need the soul has for
union with the body :
It was shown [in SCG, II.79], that the souls of human beings are immortal.
Therefore, they remain after the bodies [are corrupted], being independent of bodies
[a corporibus absolutae]. Also, it’s clear from things said in book II [chapters 83, 68]
that the soul is naturally united to a body, for [a soul] is, according to its essence, the
form of a body. For this reason, it is against the nature of the soul to exist without
the body. Nothing that is contrary to nature can exist perpetually, however. Therefore,
the soul will not exist perpetually without the body. So, since the soul remains
perpetually, it must be joined again to the body, which is what it means to be
resurrected. Thus, the immortality of souls seems to require a future resurrection of
bodies.13

Aquinas’s argument here in favour of a bodily resurrection relies on two
claims familiar from his general account of human nature, namely that : (1) the
soul is, by nature, immortal, and that (2) the rational soul’s nature as the substantial form of the human being mandates union with a body.14 The explanation
for (2) is that – since the very ‘essence ’ of the rational soul involves structuring,
organizing, and vivifying a human body – a soul separated from a body can’t do
what it’s meant by nature to do. Although the soul’s nature doesn’t require being
joined to the body at all times, it is unnatural (in the strict sense of ‘natural ’) for it
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to be separated from matter, and Aquinas’s point here is that this state of aﬀairs
can’t continue without end. Since the human soul is immortal, however, it would
remain in that unnatural state perpetually unless it were reunited with matter,
and so it’s clear (if we accept the premises of the argument) that the soul must be
joined to a body again at some point.
The main interest of this particular argument lies in its application of the
general principles of Aquinas’s theory of human nature to the special case of
the bodily resurrection. We might well expect Aquinas to shy away from
discussing his claim (stated explicitly in Summa Theologiae, Ia.75.4) that a human
soul is not identical with the human being, and that the soul is ‘incomplete ’ in
separation from the body. After all, it’s this very emphasis on the composite
nature of the human being that appears to cause serious problems for his account
of post-mortem human identity. Instead, Aquinas uses exactly that point to
support the doctrine of the bodily resurrection.
In the following argument of SCG, IV.79, Aquinas stresses this point even
more strongly, underscoring the soul’s status as part of the composite human
being rather than the whole human being : ‘ The soul separated from the body
is in a way imperfect, like every part existing apart from its whole : for the
soul is naturally part of human nature. ’15 What’s more, Aquinas goes on to
argue that a perpetual separation of soul from body would mean that complete happiness could never be achieved: complete happiness involves the satisfaction of all natural desires, and the separated soul naturally inclines toward
reunion with its body (in the same way that a dropped rock falls downward
because of its natural inclination to be ‘ down’). Human nature requires that
a human being possess both body and soul ; as Aquinas states in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, ‘ The soul of Abraham is not Abraham
himself, properly speaking, but is part of him’ (43.1.1a.ad2).16 Later, he adds,
‘Other things being equal, the status of the soul in the body is more perfect than
the status of the soul outside the body, since it is part of the whole composite ’
(ibid., ad4).17 If the rational soul existed perpetually apart from the body, one part
of the human being – David’s soul – would persist, while the whole human
being – David himself – would be lost.
It seems clear, then, that Aquinas believes not only that a bodily resurrection is
compatible with his account of human nature but that it is in fact demanded by it
for the immortality of an individual human being. At the same time, Aquinas
recognizes that, on his account, the bodily resurrection raises vexing questions
about human identity – questions he attempts to answer in SCG, IV.81. In what
follows, I focus on one particularly pressing objection to the claim that the very
same human being is present after the resurrection as existed before death and
examine Aquinas’s response in light of a criticism raised to the objection by
Christopher Hughes.
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The principle of non-repeatability and Hughes’s criticism

In SCG, IV.80, Aquinas lays out three objections to the view that the resurrected human being will be numerically identical with the original human being. The most philosophically daunting proceeds as follows :
In no natural thing is that which is corrupted found to be brought back to existence
the same in number, just as it seems that nothing [which had a particular disposition]
can be returned from some privation to having the disposition. And, therefore, since
those things that are corrupted cannot be repeated with numerical identity, nature
intends that something the same in species as that which is corrupted is preserved
through generation. For this reason, since human beings are corrupted through death,
and the body of a human being is itself broken down [resolvatur] all the way to the ﬁrst
elements, it doesn’t seem that a human being can be restored to life the same in
number.18

This argument crucially depends on what I’ll call the principle of nonrepeatability : viz. the principle that no thing A that is destroyed (i.e. corrupted)
at time t can be numerically identical with a thing B that exists at a later time tk.
This claim is supposed to be analogous to Aristotle’s point in Physics, V.5 that a
disposition (such as health) that is acquired after a privation (in this case, sickness) is numerically distinct from the original disposition.19 In other words, the
health David possesses before he gets a cold is numerically distinct from the
health David possesses after he recovers. Once David’s original health has been
corrupted by disease, it can’t be restored as the very same disposition – David has
a diﬀerent instance of ‘ health’ before and after his sickness.20
According to this objection, what’s true in the case of dispositions is also true in
the case of natural things. For example, if, after an oak tree A is cut down and used
for ﬁrewood, an oak tree B grows in exactly the same place, it seems clear that
A and B are numerically distinct, even if they happen to be qualitatively identical.
In fact, on this line of argument, the non-repeatable nature of natural things is the
very reason why species reproduce: the process of generation of individuals
within a species is what ensures that the species will continue despite the corruption of its individual members. Individual oak trees are non-repeatable, and
so they produce acorns in order for there to be other oak trees after the original
ones die. More to the point, according to this general principle of nonrepeatability, once a human being dies and is corrupted, it is impossible for a
human being to exist at a later time who is numerically identical with the original
human being. (That the human being is corrupted seems evident, since on
Aquinas’s theory a human being is a composite of soul and body.) Once David
dies, this objection claims, we’ve lost David forever, even if God produces
something which looks and acts exactly like David.
The principle of non-repeatability (PNR) seems obviously true in the cases I’ve
discussed : in the normal course of nature, you don’t get the same members of a
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natural species repeated after they die – you get new members of the same species. In his response to this objection, Aquinas himself accepts PNR without discussion. Yet, as Christopher Hughes has argued in a discussion of this passage,
PNR seems obviously false in other cases ; thus Hughes claims that Aquinas
should have responded to this objection by rejecting the principle out of hand.21
Hughes makes this point by ﬁrst summarizing objection one as follows : ‘ Once
things have undergone corruption, they cannot come back into existence. At
death a man undergoes corruption ; so he cannot come back to life’ (98); Hughes
then derives a ‘ principle of continuity ’ based on this, namely, C1 : Necessarily, in
the course of nature: if a and b are identical, and if a exists at time t, and b exists at
time tk, then a is not corrupted between t and tk (99). Hughes then claims, ﬁrst,
that Aquinas accepts C1 and, second, that he’s wrong in doing so.
In order to prove that Aquinas should have denied C1, Hughes constructs a
thought-experiment involving two qualitatively identical bicycles, A and B.
Suppose, he says, he brings the bikes home from the shop and completely disassembles them. He then puts half of A’s parts together with half of B’s parts, and
half of B’s parts together with half of A’s parts. Now there appear to be two new
bicycles, call them C and D, which are identical neither to each other nor to A and
B. At this point, however, he can disassemble those bicycles and put all the parts
that were originally in A back together, and all the parts that were originally in B
back together, ‘so that ’ he says, ‘ everything looks just as it did when I brought the
bicycles home from the shop ’ (107). At this point, it appears that A and B have
come back into existence, and that C and D have ceased to exist. Of course, he
could go through the process of disassembly and reassembly again, at which
point C and D will come back from nonexistence. ‘So ’, Hughes concludes, ‘both
(C1), and the stronger principle that results from deleting ‘ in the course of nature ’
from (C1), appear not to be true’ (107).
In fact, it doesn’t even seem necessary to go to such extravagant lengths in
order to ﬁnd examples that appear to refute both C1 and PNR. Take the simple
case of a broken lawnmower that is disassembled, repaired, and then reassembled. What we seem to have here is one, not two, numerically distinct
lawnmowers, despite the fact that the lawnmower is ‘ corrupted’ when its parts
are strewn across my driveway. Given this rather common happening (in cases
involving, e.g. lawnmowers, bikes, watches, and computers), Hughes seems right
in arguing that it does seem possible for things to be ﬁrst corrupted and then
repeated with numerical identity.
Hughes is also right in thinking that Aquinas doesn’t appear to recognize this
diﬃculty with PNR, and not for lack of similar objects or similar examples in his
own lifetime. (In the section of his Sentences commentary devoted to the bodily
resurrection, for example, Aquinas’s contemporary, Bonaventure, considers
whether a wooden chest that is taken apart and then reassembled is numerically
identical with the original wooden chest.22) In his reply to this objection, Aquinas
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accepts the principle of non-repeatability as given and works at providing an
argument for why the case of resurrected human beings can be an exception to it.
In so doing, Hughes argues, Aquinas gives himself needless trouble.
Artefacts and natural things

In making this argument, however, I believe that Hughes himself overlooks a crucial qualiﬁcation that is built right into the original statement of PNR in
SCG, IV.81; as a result, neither Hughes’s summary nor his proposed principle of
continuity adequately captures the force of the original objection. In fact, I’ll
argue that Aquinas is right in accepting PNR, and that this objection proves
harder to overcome than Hughes believes – although Aquinas’s account does
possess the resources with which to do so.
Recall that the objection as stated in IV.81 began with the claim that ‘ in no
natural thing [naturalium rerum] is that which is corrupted found to be brought
back to existence the same in number. ’ Hughes glosses this in his principle of
continuity as the claim that ‘ Necessarily, in the course of nature : if a and b are
identical, and if a exists at time t, and b exists at time tk, then a is not corrupted
between t and tk’ (99, added emphasis). In Hughes’s summary, then, the principle
of non-repeatability becomes the general claim that, in the natural world, no
thing that is corrupted can come back into existence.
I believe, however, that the original mention of natural things isn’t just a casual
reference to the normal state of aﬀairs. Rather, the objection is very carefully
intended to pick up on the distinction between natural things and artefacts. That
is, the principle on which the objection rests (and to which Aquinas responds) is a
principle pertaining speciﬁcally to the non-repeatability of natural things, not to
all things found in the physical world. Thus, although Hughes is right that PNR
fails for artefacts like bicycles and lawnmowers, that failure doesn’t impact the
original objection : the principle was never meant to apply to such cases anyway.
And, as we’ll see, it’s not at all obvious that PNR fails in the case of natural things.
Although Aquinas doesn’t explicitly mention artefacts in SCG, IV.81, he distinguishes between natural substances and artefacts in numerous places,
including three of his earlier discussions of the bodily resurrection (namely,
Scriptum, IV.44.1.1b.ad4, 1c.sc1, and Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 11.6.1.ad3).23 In
each of these passages, Aquinas draws a sharp distinction between natural things
and artefacts, arguing that they have diﬀerent identity conditions.
In fact, in QQ, 11.6.1, Aquinas brings in the distinction between natural things
and artefacts precisely when addressing the identity of the resurrected human
body. The discussion here arises in response to the objection that the resurrected
body cannot be one in number with the original body. For, as ‘ the Philosopher
says in his book On the Soul, the statue which is destroyed is not the same as the
statue which is re-fashioned from the same gold. By the same argument, the body
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which is now corrupted will not be numerically identical with the body which is
resurrected. ’24 That is, if I take a gold statue of Hypatia, melt it down, and refashion it into another statue of Hypatia, it seems fairly clear that there are two,
numerically distinct statues involved even if the two statues resemble each other
exactly.25 In the same way, the objection goes, if David’s body is completely
‘melted down’ or corrupted after death, then the body that is refashioned at the
end times must be numerically distinct from David’s original body.
Aquinas responds to this objection by claiming that statues are diﬀerent from
human bodies in one very important respect : statues are artefacts, and human
bodies are natural substances:
All artefacts are placed in a genus or a species in two ways, since [an artefact is placed
in a genus or species] either with respect to its matter or with respect to its form.
Natural things, however, are placed in a genus or species only through their forms.
Moreover, artiﬁcial forms, since they are accidental [forms], ought to be placed in a
genus or species through matter; but natural forms should not, since they are
substantial forms. For this reason, I say that if the statue is considered as placed in a
genus or species through its matter, then the same statue is re-fashioned. But if it is
considered as placed in a genus or species through its form, in this case I say that it is
not the same statue, but a diﬀerent one; for there is one form for this [statue], and
another form for that one. In the body, however, this is not the case, since there will
be the same form in the [resurrected] body. (ad3)26

Because the forms of artefacts, such as statues (and bicycles), are accidental
forms, then, they are most properly placed in a genus and species according to
their matter (e.g. gold or steel), although they can also be placed in a genus and
species according to the artefactual form ‘ statue ’ or ‘ bicycle’. Natural things, on
the other hand, are placed in genera and species only according to their substantial forms (which artefacts don’t possess per se).
As Aquinas points out, this distinction entails that the identity conditions for
artefacts diﬀer from the identity conditions for natural substances. In particular,
it means that there are two possible answers to the question ‘Is this the same
statue ? ’, but only one possible answer to the question ‘ Is this the same human
being ? ’. In the case of the statue, the answer depends on whether you’re referring
to the matter (the gold), in which case the answer is ‘ Yes’, or whether you’re
referring to the artefactual form (‘statue ’), in which case, the answer is ‘ No ’.27
The main reason for the ambiguity is that, in the case of artefacts, the only real
substance in question is what’s being referred to as the matter: gold, wood, steel,
etc. But gold, wood, and steel are already composites of substantial form and
matter. In the case of natural substances such as human beings, of course, this
problem simply doesn’t arise.
Thus, it seems that Aquinas would solve the question of the identity of the
reconstituted statue or the reassembled bicycles by claiming that whether or not
the thing counts as the same statue or the same bicycle depends on whether
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you’re appealing to its matter or to its artefactual form. To return to Hughes’s
example involving bikes A and B, Aquinas would apparently say that the reassembled bicycles can count as A and B insofar as they possess the same matter
that originally constituted A and B. In the same sense that the two statues fashioned from the same gold count as the same statue (because the same gold is
involved in both cases), the bicycles count as the same bicycles (because the
same steel, plastic, etc. is involved in both cases).
When considered this way, however, Aquinas’s account looks problematic.
According to the position he’s laid out, it looks as if the original bike is identical
with the reassembled bike in exactly the same way that the original bike would be
identical with a bicycle made up of parts which had been melted down from the
original bike and refashioned so that what used to be the fender was now
the handlebars, etc. Same ‘ stuﬀ’, diﬀerent artiﬁcial forms. This position goes
directly against our intuitions in these cases, however. I think we want to say that
in the case Hughes imagines, the reassembled bicycle is identical to the original
bicycle, whereas the totally reworked bicycle isn’t. But it looks as if the position
Aquinas adopts with respect to artefacts commits him to the highly unintuitive
claim that the reassembled bicycle is identical to the original bicycle in exactly
the same, very weak sense that the completely refashioned bicycle is identical to
the original – that is, the sense in which both bicycles are made from the same
‘ stuﬀ’. Fortunately, the real issue at hand isn’t whether Aquinas has picked out
the right criteria of identity for artefacts, but whether the distinction he draws
between artefacts and natural things defends the principle of non-repeatability
against Hughes’s objection. The bicycles count as numerically distinct bicycles
insofar as the artefactual form ‘ bicycle’ is concerned.
For our purposes, what proves most important about the distinction Aquinas
draws here between artefacts and natural substances is that the original objection
explicitly speciﬁed that ‘ for no natural thing is that which is corrupted and that
which is returned to being the same in number ’. It seems clear that – in light of
Aquinas’s claim that artefacts and natural things possess diﬀering identity conditions – we should thus take PNR as meant to refer only to natural substances,
such as oak trees or hamsters (call this, if you want, the principle of natural nonrepeatability).
This clariﬁcation about the scope of PNR has signiﬁcant consequences for its
plausibility, however, for none of the examples raised so far that appear to refute
the principle of non-repeatability involve natural substances. Indeed, when PNR
is properly understood, it becomes signiﬁcantly harder to imagine counterexamples to the principle. The principle seems especially plausible in the case of
living organisms, a sub-set of natural things, and the sub-set to which human
beings (the natural things in question) belong. It’s certainly more diﬃcult to
conceive of how a hamster which has died and decomposed could be reconstructed as the very same hamster than it is to conceive of how a bicycle which
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was taken apart could be restored.28 Aquinas, after all, is addressing the corruption of a human body at death, not a Frankenstein-style case in which diﬀerent
body parts are removed from and then reattached to living organisms : he acknowledges that the matter that constitutes a human being’s body can undergo
substantial ﬂuctuation throughout the life of the human being.29
For Aquinas, the key feature which sets living organisms apart from artefacts
is that living beings (and not artefacts) possess a unifying principle of life – an
esse – which seems impossible to restore to an organism once it has lost it. It’s
precisely the diﬃculty of explaining how a natural thing that has ceased to live
can be numerically identical to something that exists at a later time, however, on
which the ﬁrst objection in SCG, IV.80 focuses – not diﬃculties involving nonliving lawnmowers and statues.
Given, then, that PNR is meant to apply only to natural substances and not to
artefacts, it seems that Aquinas is faced in SCG, IV.80 with a perfectly legitimate
objection (and, in fact, one which is strikingly similar to contemporary objections
to the resurrection of the body) : namely, how can a resurrected human being be
the very same human being who ceased to exist at death ? As the objection points
out, ‘human beings are corrupted through death, and the body of a human being
is broken down all the way to the ﬁrst elements ’. If human beings aren’t ‘repeatable ’ in the way that artefacts are, it does seem impossible for the resurrected
David to be numerically identical with the original David.

Aquinas’s response

Nevertheless, given both Aquinas’s general theory of human nature and
what he’s said about the relation between body and soul only one chapter earlier
in SCG, it seems clear that Aquinas has an answer to this objection ready to hand.
In particular, we might expect Aquinas to respond to this objection by explaining
that human beings prove an exception to the general rule because – unlike all
other living organisms – they possess immortal souls that survive their death. In
other words, we might expect Aquinas to counter the objection by pointing out
that human beings aren’t completely corrupted at death ; PNR is true, but the
bodily resurrection doesn’t violate it because the human being never actually
ceased to exist in the relevant sense.
It’s initially surprising, then, that Aquinas’s response doesn’t focus at all on the
unique status of the rational soul. Rather than concentrating on the sense in
which the human being isn’t corrupted at death, Aquinas focuses instead on
God’s ability to do things which nature can’t :
The power of nature is inferior to [deﬁciens] the divine power, just as the power of an
instrument [is inferior to] the power of the principal agent. So, although this can’t be
brought about by an act of nature – namely, that a corrupted body be restored to
life – nevertheless, this can be brought about by divine power. The reason nature can’t
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do this is that nature always acts through some form. What has a form, however,
already exists. But when [the body] was corrupted, it lost the form that used to be [its]
principle of action. For this reason, that which is corrupted can’t be brought back the
same in number by an act of nature. But the divine power, which brings a thing into
existence, is able to produce an eﬀect of nature, just as is made through nature, apart
from nature, as was shown above [SCG, III.99]. Thus, since the divine power remains
the same even when things are corrupted, it can restore the corrupted thing to
integrity.30

The argument here, simply put, is that God can do things nature can’t, including
restoring life to something that had lost it. The reason for this, Aquinas states
here, is that nature always has to act through forms : if a natural object has been
corrupted, then there’s no form left for nature to act through. Thus, something
that has been corrupted can’t be restored by nature. God doesn’t share this
limitation, however, and so He’s able to restore the same thing to existence even
after it’s been corrupted.
At ﬁrst glance, this argument seems too strong – and unnecessarily so.
Aquinas’s claim that ‘the divine power, which brings a thing into existence, is
able to produce an eﬀect of nature … apart from nature ’, and, thus, that ‘ since
the divine power remains the same even when things are corrupted, it can restore
the corrupted thing to integrity ’, could easily be read as the claim that, since
God’s power remains constant, God can recreate anything which has been corrupted as the very same thing.
But this claim seems doubtful at best, and blatantly false at worst. As Peter van
Inwagen argues in a famous thought-experiment, if a group of monks claims in
1997 to possess a manuscript ‘ written in St Augustine’s own hand ’ which was
burned by Arians in 457, and yet which was miraculously recreated by God in 458,
we’re likely to have the following reaction:
The deed [thus described] seems impossible, even as an accomplishment of
omnipotence. God certainly might have created a perfect duplicate of the original
manuscript, but it would not have been that one; its earliest moment of existence
would have been after Augustine’s death; it would never have known the impress of
his hand ; it would not have been a part of the furniture of the world when he was
alive; and so on. (45)31

In other words, even God can’t recreate a physical object once it’s been completely destroyed, because the recreated object wouldn’t possess the right sort of
causal connection to the original. At best, God could produce a perfect duplicate
of the original object. This seems as true in the case of hamsters, oak trees, and
human beings as it does in the case of the manuscript. On these grounds, then, it
seems doubtful that even God could resurrect a human being who is numerically
identical to one who has died and whose body has decomposed, despite what
Aquinas claims here.
What makes Aquinas’s ‘God-can-do-things-nature-cannot ’ response to the
non-repeatability objection especially odd, moreover, is that it fails to appeal to
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the continued existence of the human substantial form – namely, the rational
soul. Aquinas holds that one of the primary characteristics that distinguishes
the substantial form of a human being from the substantial form of every other
physical substance is that human souls survive the death of the composite,
while the forms of all other material substances perish. In fact, as we have seen,
Aquinas appeals to the immortality of the human soul in defending the very
possibility of bodily resurrection. If the substantial form of a human being never
goes out of existence, though, it would appear that both God and nature do still
has something to act through ; so it seems, on this argument, that the resurrection
of the body should be possible through either an act of God or an act of nature.
Thus, it might appear that Aquinas has not only overlooked the obvious point that
human forms survive death, but that he’s also overlooked an obvious consequence of this claim – viz. that the bodily resurrection is something nature can
accomplish.
The resurrection of the body

I believe, however, that Aquinas is intentional in his not bringing the
separated soul into his response to this objection, for I believe that the primary
concern in both the objection and the reply is the status of the corrupted
human body and only consequentially the status of the composite human being.
The original objection focuses on the fact that ‘ the body of a human being is
itself broken down all the way to the ﬁrst elements ’ ; in his response, Aquinas
picks up on this worry, claiming that ‘ although this can’t be brought about
by nature – namely, that a corrupted body be restored to life – nevertheless,
this can be brought about by divine power ’. Human bodies, after all, don’t diﬀer
from the bodies of other living organisms in terms of their decomposition after
death.
With this focus, Aquinas’s claim that nature doesn’t have a form to work with in
the case of human death seems more plausible. When the body is corrupted, it
does lose the form that used to be its principle of action : the human soul persists
apart from the body and outside the realm of nature. That’s just what it means for
a human being to be dead – the rational soul separates from matter and persists
in a disembodied state until the bodily resurrection. Although the rational soul
survives the death of the composite human being, then, it’s not available to
nature qua form. Thus, nature can’t act through the form of the human being in
order to restore the human body to life.
This also makes Aquinas’s claim that in this case God can do something nature
can’t do seem more relevant. Although the human soul is not available to the
natural realm, God still has ‘access ’ to the human soul and can restore the human
body by rejoining the body to its principle of action. If we restrict the scope of
Aquinas’s claim about divine power only to the cases in which a form survives the
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death of the composite – i.e. only to the case of human beings – it seems that
Aquinas does have some reason for claiming that, although human beings can’t
be brought back to life through the normal course of nature, God can act above
and beyond nature to reunite the still-existing human soul with matter ; this act
will result in the restoration of both that human being, and that human being’s
body.
Furthermore, even if Aquinas’s claim is taken as applying broadly to all natural
substances (and not just to human beings – the only natural substances whose
substantial form survives death of the composite), at least some people believe
that God can recreate a physical organism which has been completely destroyed.
Here again, the distinction between natural substances and artefacts becomes
relevant, since artefacts (such as manuscripts) appear to require a certain sort of
origin to count as the same artefact. Lynne Rudder Baker, for instance, argues that
Van Inwagen’s analogy of the burnt manuscript fails in one crucial respect to
parallel the case of living organisms, particularly human beings :
But the case of the resurrection is diﬀerent: Although God could not simply will that a
certain manuscript have the property of having been inscribed by Augustine without
involving Augustine, He could simply will (it seems to me) there to be a body that
has the complexity to subserve Smith’s mental states, and that is suitably related to
Smith’s biological body, to constitute Smith … If creation of a resurrected body is
within the power of God at all, it seems to me equally in his power to produce the
conditions necessary for the body to constitute Smith, where what makes Smith the
person she is are her characteristic intentional states, including ﬁrst-person reference
to her body.32

That is, Baker argues, if God is able to create a resurrected body at all, it seems
plausible to suppose that God could guarantee that such a body constitutes a
particular person. If we suppose that God could recreate a physical body numerically identical to David’s original body, then it seems that Aquinas would be
right to claim that God is able to recreate any physical organism at all. On such a
position, even the overstated version of Aquinas’s response would eﬀectively
counter the original objection.33

Causal connections and ‘ gappy ’ existence

Aquinas’s focus on the corrupted human body (rather than on the rational
soul) thus renders his reply more philosophically plausible than it ﬁrst appears.
It doesn’t, however, seem adequate to explain how the identity of the resurrected
to the original David is compatible with the radical break in continuity that death
appears to constitute. Although Aquinas’s reply to the objection is incomplete
in this way, I believe that Aquinas’s general account of human nature does possess the resources with which to respond to this worry. In the remainder of
this paper, I sketch what such a response might look like by : (1) appealing to

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412507009031 Published online by Cambridge University Press

385

386

CHRISTINA VAN DYKE

the importance of immanent causal connections in identity, and then (2) arguing
that the persistence of the rational soul is suﬃcient to guarantee that the resurrected human being bears the appropriate causal relation to the original human
being.34
As we’ve seen, Aquinas’s claim that a human being is identical to the composite of matter and substantial form entails that a human being ceases to exist at
death and prior to the bodily resurrection. Both defenders and critics of
Aquinas have long identiﬁed this diﬃculty – what I’ll call the problem of ‘ gappy’
existence – as one of the most serious diﬃculties facing his account of human
identity.35 Sandra Edwards argues that Aquinas is, in fact, unable to answer this
worry adequately :
If a man is an organic unity of the sort Aquinas has in mind, then the body after death is
not the man, nor is the disembodied soul the man … . If the soul is not the man, then at
death there is a break in the continuity of the individual [human being] which even
bodily resurrection cannot remedy.36

This is not a problem unique to Aquinas’s account of human identity, however :
gappy existence poses a problem for any non-substance-dualist account of personal identity (including materialist accounts) that attempts to accommodate
the bodily resurrection without claiming that the body somehow survives our
death (due to, e.g. last-minute ﬁssion or God’s miraculous intervention). In general, any theory which holds that a person is not identical to her soul (and
which also holds that there will be a bodily resurrection) will need to address the
problem that – for all appearances – that person ceases to exist for a time at
death.
Some people try to solve this problem by claiming that death constitutes the
end of our existence as temporal creatures, and, thus, that there is no temporal
gap in existence between death and the bodily resurrection. Brown, for instance,
tries to solve the problem of ‘ gappy’ existence as follows : ‘ Discontinuity depends
on a break in time, and … time is not at issue here ’ (193–194). This doesn’t seem
like a promising solution to me, at least with respect to Aquinas’s account of
human nature, for at least two reasons : (1) as we’ll see, the real problem with the
bodily resurrection doesn’t seem to be a gap in time but rather a gap in causal
connections ; and (2) Aquinas is far more concerned with explaining human
identity that he would need to be if he adopted Brown’s line on the separated
soul. Brown’s defence of this position also rests on the supposition that separated
souls exist in aeviternity, like the angels ; there appears to be no textual support
for this claim in Aquinas, however, and it would pose a variety of other problems
for Aquinas’s account of the bodily resurrection (since material beings necessarily exist in time).
For this reason, the growing consensus that temporal gaps in a person’s
existence don’t necessarily pose a serious impediment to continued identity
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represents a particularly interesting development in contemporary philosophy.
Spatio-temporal continuity is increasingly seen as neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient condition for something’s persisting as the same object.37 Thus, many
contemporary philosophers (whose intuitions are primed with heavy doses of
Star Trek malfunctioning-transporter examples and defective brain-state transfer
devices) don’t see spatio-temporal gaps in existence as, in and of themselves,
constituting an insurmountable diﬃculty for accounts of personal identity.
Instead, such philosophers claim that the real challenge is providing an account
of personal identity which guarantees the correct sort of causal connections between the person at time t and the person at time tk. Although Captain Kirk may
not actually exist between time t and time tk (when the transporter he was using
malfunctioned and failed to transport him instantaneously), there’s a growing
intuition that the Captain Kirk who’s ﬁnally transported to the Enterprise at time tk
is numerically identical to the Captain Kirk who entered the transporter at time t,
so long as the right causal connections obtain.
What this means for philosophical defences of the bodily resurrection, of
course, is that the problem of explaining how the resurrected David is identical to
the original David isn’t a problem posed ﬁrst and foremost by a temporal gap in
his existence, for a temporal gap will pose an indefeasible diﬃculty only if it is
accompanied by a gap in the relevant sorts of causal connections. If the problem
facing a philosophical defence of bodily resurrection involves preserving appropriate causal connections between the earthly and resurrected human being,
however, then the real challenge for Aquinas is to provide an account of human
identity that can explain how these sorts of causal connections are preserved
between the resurrected and the original human being. And this is just what I
think his account does provide, with its emphasis on the rational soul – that which
makes a human being that which it is, and which continues at death – as
grounding human identity.
To see this, it’s helpful to look more closely at the role of immanent causation
in diachronic identity. First, although it’s diﬃcult to pin down exactly what causal
relations are ‘appropriate ’, it seems true that in order for a material object to
count as the same thing over time, its later states must be causally dependent on
its earlier states in some way. As Dean Zimmerman says,
[I]n order that a given material object – or any other individual thing, for that
matter – persist throughout a given period of time, there must be appropriate causal
relations between the object as it is at earlier times and the object as it is as later
times … . Later states of a persisting body must be causally dependent, at least in part,
upon its earlier states. (195).38

To preserve identity, moreover, the appropriate sort of causal dependence
must obtain. In particular, although God’s action of recreating a human being at
the bodily resurrection can be seen as ensuring some sort of causal dependence
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of the post-resurrection body on the earlier body (assuming that God fashions the
resurrected David from a sort of ‘ blueprint’ of the original David), it doesn’t seem
to be enough to guarantee diachronic identity :
The way my body was at death [cannot] serve as a mere blueprint for God’s creation of a
new one at the general resurrection. That is causal contribution of a sort; but here the
causal chain passes through God’s mind ; it doesn’t remain at all times ‘ immanent ’ with
respect to processes going on inside a living human body (195).

In particular, God’s using a mere mental blueprint of David-at-death in recreating David at the bodily resurrection doesn’t appear to preserve the immanent causal connections which need to obtain between David’s diﬀerent
temporal stages. God’s act of recreating David in this way would appear instead to
constitute the beginning of a new life, in the same way that (as we have seen) his
creating in 458 a perfect duplicate of the manuscript burned in 457 constitutes the
beginning a new manuscript and not the continuation of the old one. A life is
the sort of thing whose ‘causal paths’ end at death ; God can’t recreate a being
numerically identical to the original David if David’s life has ended. It seems,
then, that the resurrected human being can be identical to the original human
being only if, in some way or other, the life of a human being doesn’t end at
death – that is, if the appropriate causal paths remain intact.39
It is no small matter, then, that Aquinas’s general account of human nature
leaves him in the position to make exactly this claim. According to Aquinas, a
human being’s life, understood as her esse (‘ being ’, or ‘ actualized existence’),
doesn’t end at death.40 Rather, it continues in virtue of the soul’s persistence. In
his words :
It is clear that the esse of matter and form is one, for matter has being in actuality only
through form … . But the rational soul clearly exceeds matter in action, for it has a
certain action apart from bodily organs, namely intellection. For this reason, [the soul]
doesn’t have esse only when it’s joined to matter. Therefore, its esse, which was [the
esse] of the composite, remains in the soul after the dissolution of the body; and when
the body is restored in the resurrection, it is brought back in the same esse – the esse
which remains in the soul. (SCG, IV.81)41

Although David doesn’t exist as such when his soul is separated from matter,
then, the resurrected David doesn’t have two beginnings of existence, properly
speaking, because his life – his esse – continues via his soul at his death.
One might worry here that claiming that David doesn’t exist, properly speaking,
while his existence continues is – at best – a contradiction in terms. Yet this is
precisely Aquinas’s view, and its plausibility rests entirely on the sense in which
the rational soul diﬀers from both all physical objects and the substantial forms of
all other physical substances. Although it is true on Aquinas’s account that, were
you to remove David’s foot from the rest of his body, David’s foot would possess a
new ‘esse ’ (since it’s no longer ‘ David’s foot ’ but now ‘ detached foot ’), the same
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is not true in the case of the separated soul. Because the soul can (and does)
persist in separation from matter – unlike all other substantial forms – Aquinas
claims that it preserves David’s original esse. As he claims in the above passage,
because the soul can persist apart from matter, its esse, ‘which was [the esse] of
the composite, remains in the soul after the dissolution of the body ; and when the
body is restored in the resurrection, it is brought back in the same esse – the esse
which remains in the soul ’. In short, the soul’s continuing to exist proves sufﬁcient for David’s esse to continue to exist.
Once we grant Aquinas the existence of this separated soul, I believe that we
can make sense of his claims about the rational soul’s grounding the identity of
the human being (without being identical to the human being) in terms of its
guaranteeing the proper sorts of immanent causal relations.42 It seems to me that,
on Aquinas’s account of human nature, the persistence of the rational soul – the
substantial form of the human body – at death can be seen as meeting
Zimmerman’s reasonable requirement of ‘ preserving the self-sustaining structure peculiar to the living thing in question ’, even in separation from matter.
During earthly life, the persistence of the human soul guarantees the preservation
of such a structure peculiar to the living human being, and there’s no reason why,
if the soul persists at death, it should be thought of as losing its ability to preserve
that structure after the human being’s death simply because that ability is not
being actualized.43
On Aquinas’s theory, then, the very nature of the human soul guarantees that
the causal connections between the earlier stages of David’s earthly existence to
the later stages of his resurrected existence are of the ‘ right sort’. For the appropriate immanent causal relations to obtain, David’s resurrected body needs to be
the way it is primarily because of the way his body was at death, and this is
precisely what holds true on Aquinas’s account. David’s body was the way it was
at death primarily because of David’s structuring, vivifying, life-preserving soul,
and David’s resurrected body is the way it is primarily because of that same soul,
whose existence continues uninterrupted throughout earthly life, death, and the
bodily resurrection. In this way, David’s resurrected existence as David – instead
of being explained directly in terms of God’s creative actions – can be explained
in terms of immanent causal connections obtaining between his earlier and later
temporal stages. Thus, it seems that the continued existence of the rational soul is
suﬃcient to preserve the necessary causal connections between the resurrected
and the original David, despite the temporal gap in David’s physical existence
after death and prior to the resurrection of the body.44
Moreover, Aquinas’s account builds the preservation of our identity into the
very centre of his theory of human nature. God’s only role in the bodily resurrection in this theory is to reunite our forms with matter. Since human beings are
by nature composites of form and matter (the substantial form of David makes
him what he is: a living, breathing human being, while his form’s unique relation
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to his body distinguishes him from all other human beings), God’s role in the
bodily resurrection can be seen as the act of putting right what was put wrong
by death : that is, rejoining what’s meant by nature to be together – form and
matter. In this way, Aquinas’s account has an edge on contemporary accounts
that require God’s dramatic intervention at the moment of death, ‘ snatching ’ our
bodies or central nervous systems at the moment of death and replacing them
with simulacra, or ‘ ﬁssing’ all of our cells at the moment of death.45
To sum up, on Aquinas’s account of human nature, David’s identity over
time is generally ensured by the persistence of his substantial form in union with
some matter or other. At death, however, David’s soul persists in separation until
it’s joined again with matter at the bodily resurrection. Although David doesn’t
exist, properly speaking, during this period of separation, the persistence
of his soul is suﬃcient to guarantee the persistence of the appropriate sorts
of immanent causal relations between David’s temporal stages, and so the resurrected David is causally related to the original David in a way suﬃcient for him
to count as the same human being. Furthermore, the rejoining of David’s soul
with matter results in the recreation of David’s own body, since David’s body just
is the physical organism resulting from the union of his substantial form with
matter.
In conclusion, although not without its problems, Aquinas’s account of human
nature yields an account of the bodily resurrection that proves not only highly
interesting but also at least as (if not more) plausible than many modern accounts. I believe that philosophers and theologians alike should agree that his
theory deserves attention not just for its historical importance but for its continued relevance to contemporary discussions.46

Notes
1. See, Summa Theologiae [hereafter ST ], Ia 75.4, and Quaestiones de Anima [hereafter QDA ], 1. Aquinas
also claims that the human being is identical to the human person (ST, Ia 29.1 and 4), and he denies that
I am identical to my soul (Ad Corinthios, 15, Commentary on Job, Lectio 2).
2. See, De Ente et Essentia [hereafter DEE ], 2 and ST, Ia.75.4, where Aquinas argues that matter needs to
appear in the very essence of a human being. That is, anything that satisﬁes the deﬁnition of ‘ human
being ’ must possess a body ; there can be no disembodied human beings.
3. See Lynne Rudder Baker’s characterization of substance dualism: ‘ According to mind/body dualism, if
Jane is a human person living in Canada, she has a body, but Jane’s existence does not depend on her
having the body that she has or on her having any body at all: If mind/body dualism is correct, even
though she is now embodied, Jane could exist as a purely immaterial being ’ ; Lynne Rudder Baker ‘ Need
a Christian be a mind/body dualist ?’, Faith and Philosophy, 12 (1995), 489–504.
4. In fact, there’s some debate over whether Aquinas’s position is fairly characterized as dualism at all.
Eleonore Stump ‘Non-Cartesian substance dualism and materialism without reductionism ’, Faith and
Philosophy, 12 (1995), 505–531, suggests the label ‘ subsistence dualism ’, although she herself calls
Aquinas a non-reductionist materialist, and argues that the dichotomy which contrasts materialism with
dualism is harmful rather than philosophically useful.
5. Aquinas holds that for something properly to be called an individual substance, it needs to meet two
conditions : (1) it must be capable of independent existence ; and (2) it must be complete in species and
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called a substance, but it fails (2), and so Aquinas claims that the soul isn’t a complete substance.
(See QDA, 1.co, and ST, Ia 75.2.ad1.)
‘ Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus ﬁt una substantia
actu existens ’ (1461). All paragraph numbers correspond to the Marietti edition of the Summa Contra
Gentiles (Turin : Marietti Editori Ltd, 1961). All translations are mine.
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‘ David is identical to his body ’, where we would typically agree that David can, nevertheless, persist
through changes in body parts (such as a foot amputation or a heart transplant). The latter case is
signiﬁcantly complicated by the diﬃculty specifying the diachronic identity conditions for material
objects (illustrated by examples such as the ship of Theseus), whereas the former case involves a
composite not of physical but of metaphysical parts whose continued persistence is necessary for the
persistence of the object in question. To see this, compare the claim ‘ David is a composite of his body
parts ’ with the claim ‘ David is a composite of form and matter ’. We can imagine David’s persisting
through the loss and/or replacement of individual body parts, whereas it’s impossible on a
hylomorphic account to imagine David’s persisting through a loss either in form or in matter. (For an
argument that questions this understanding of hylomorphic identity, however, see Eleonore Stump’s
discussion of souls, bodies, and the constitution relation in ch. 1 of Aquinas (London : Routledge, 2003),
35–60.)
See, for example, Baker ‘ Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist ?’ ; Peter van Inwagen (ed.) The
Possibility of Resurrection and other Essays in Christian Apologetics (Boulder CO : Westview Press, 1978) ;
and Dean Zimmerman ‘ The compatibility of materialism and survival : the ‘‘ falling elevator’’ model ’,
Faith and Philosophy, 16 (1999), 194–212.
Christopher Hughes ‘ Aquinas on continuity and identity ’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 6 (1997),
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For a closely parallel passage, see the Scriptum, IV.43.1.1. Lectiones II–VII of Aquinas’s commentary
on I Corinthians provide Aquinas’s most detailed examination of the doctrine of Christ’s
resurrection and its consequences for human beings, but they contain little of philosophical
interest.
Marilyn McCord Adams discusses these arguments in her survey of Aquinas’s position on the bodily
resurrection ; Marilyn McCord Adams ‘ The resurrection of the body according to three medieval
Aristotelians : Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham ’, Philosophical Topics, 20 (1992),
2–8.
‘ Ostensum est enim in Secundo animas hominum immortales esse. Remanent igitur post corpora a
corporibus absolutae. Manifestum est etiam ex his quae in Secundo dicta sunt, quod anima corpori
naturaliter unitur : est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam
animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur
perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato coniungi :
quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram ’
(4135).
The argument also relies on the rather dubious claim, which Aquinas attributes to Aristotle in his
commentary on De Caelo et Mundo (2, 269 b7–10), that nothing contrary to nature can exist perpetually.
Fortunately, the soundness of Aquinas’s argument isn’t relevant to our purposes – what’s of interest is
what this passage says about the nature of the human soul.
‘ Anima autem a corpore separata est aliquo modo imperfecta, sicut omnis pars extra suum totum
existens : anima enim naturaliter est pars humanae naturae ’ (4136).
‘ Anima Abrahae non est, proprie loquendo, ipse Abraham, sed est part ejus ; et sic de aliis. ’
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17. ‘ Ceteris paribus perfectior est status animae in corpore quam extra corpus, quia est pars totius
compositi ’. He makes this point in response to the objection that human souls should remain
disembodied because in that state they resemble God and the angels more closely.
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from Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump ‘ Aquinas, Thomas’, in Edward Craig (ed.) Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London : Routledge, 1998).)
24. ‘ Philosophus dicit in lib. de anima, quod non est eadem statua numero quae destruitur, et de eodem
aere reﬁcitur. Pari ergo ratione corpus quod modo corrumpitur, non erit idem numero cum eo quod
resurget’ ; QQ (Turin : Marietti Editori Ltd, 1956).
25. There’s an interesting ambiguity to the example as it’s set out in this passage : it’s not clear
whether Aquinas is thinking of a case in which a statue of Hypatia is melted down and then refashioned
as a statue of Xanthippe, or whether he’s thinking of Hypatia’s statue being melted down and then
refashioned as Hypatia again. I take it, though, that Aquinas’s answer is going to be the same no matter
which case he’s thinking of. Even in the case where the statue is refashioned in exactly the same
shape, I think Aquinas will claim that it has a diﬀerent form in each instance, since statue forms are
non-repeatable accidents. The case of the forms of the Hypatia statues will be parallel to the case of my
suntan last year and my suntan this year – i.e. they’re two numerically distinct instances of the same
property, ‘ being shaped like Hypatia’, or ‘ being tan ’.
26. ‘ [O]mnia artiﬁcialia ponuntur dupliciter in genere vel in specie ; quia vel per materiam suam, vel per
formam suam. Naturalia autem ponuntur in genere vel specie tantum per formam suam. Formae autem
artiﬁciales, quia sunt accidentia, idea oportet quod collocentur in genere vel specie per materiam;
naturales vero non, quia sunt substantiales. ’
27. One might suppose that, were every atom in the refashioned statue B situated precisely where
each atom was situated in the original statue A, B and A would count as the same statue. Aquinas
would, however, likely point out that this is still an appeal to features of the matter of the statue.
His position on artefactual identity relies on sameness of form : the artefactual form of B is numerically
distinct from A (in the same way that each miniature replica of Michelangelo’s David possesses
a distinct artefactual form), and so B and A would count as diﬀerent statues, despite similarities
in matter.
28. There are, of course, cases involving living organisms which appear somewhat vague : suppose that a
hamster dies, but that a dedicated veterinarian manages to bring it back to life a moment later. In that
case (and similar cases), I believe Aquinas would claim that it is the same hamster (or human being,
koala bear, etc.). In cases that involve a greater time-span between the end of biological life processes
and reanimation, however, it is more diﬃcult to speculate on Aquinas’s behalf. In general, though, it
seems to me that the question here involves epistemological diﬃculties specifying the precise moment
at which the substantial form/soul separates from matter, rather than metaphysical diﬃculties with
Aquinas’s account of human nature.
29. See ST, Ia.119 and a slightly later passage SCG, IV.81. In both places, Aquinas claims that the matter that
composes the human body can change over time without compromising the identity of the human
being, so long as the substantial form remains the same.
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30. ‘ Secundum hoc igitur ad primum dicendum quod virtus naturae deﬁciens est a virtute divina, sicut
virtus instrumenti a virtute principalis agentis. Quamvis igitur operatione naturae hoc ﬁeri non possit, ut
corpus corruptum reparetur ad vitam, tamen virtute divina id ﬁeri potest. Nam quod natura hoc facere
non possit, ideo est quia natura semper per formam aliquam operatur. Quod autem habet formam, iam
est. Cum vero corruptum est, formam amisit, quae poterat esse actionis principium. Unde operatione
naturae, quod corruptum est idem numero reparari non potest. Sed divina virtus, quae res produxit in
esse, sic per naturam operatur quod absque ea eﬀectum naturae producere potest, ut superius est
ostensum. Unde, cum virtus divina maneat eadem etiam rebus corruptis, potest corrupta in integrum
reparare ’ (4150).
31. Peter van Inwagen ‘ The possibility of resurrection ’, in idem The Possibility of Resurrection and other
Essays in Christian Apologetics, 45–51.
32. Baker ‘ Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist? ’, 499.
33. Baker’s position relies on an interesting version of non-reductionist materialism according to which the
human body constitutes the human being without being identical to that human being. See Lynne
Rudder Baker ‘ Why constitution is not identity ’, The Journal of Philosophy, 94 (1997), 599–621.
34. I cannot, of course, hope fully to spell out such an account here ; the position I lay out here is meant to
indicate in outline what such an account would look like.
35. As Montague Brown asks, ‘ Granted that there is to be a resurrection of the body with the rational soul
providing the transition from this life to the other, would not the break in continuity between the soul’s
information of the body in this life and its information of the resurrected body rule out the possibility of
the person being one and the same in each case ? ’ ; Montague Brown ‘ Aquinas on the resurrection of the
body ’, The Thomist, 56 (1992), 165–207, 193.
36. Sandra Edwards ‘ Saint Thomas Aquinas on ‘‘ the same man ’’’, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 10
(1979), 94–95.
37. See Sydney Shoemaker ‘ Identity, properties, and causality ’, in idem (ed.) Identity, Cause and Mind
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984), 234–260 ; Dean Zimmerman ‘ Immanent causation ’, in
J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives XI : Mind, Causation, and World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997),
433–471 ; Hud Hudson A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca NY : Cornell University
Press, 2001), especially chs 4 and 7.
38. Zimmerman ‘ The compatibility of materialism and survival ’.
39. This is, of course, what drives materialists such as Hudson, Van Inwagen, and Zimmerman to claim that
a person’s life does not end at death, contrary to popular opinion. Rather, God preserves David’s life in
some way or another by preserving whatever material component of the person is necessary for David’s
continued identity.
40. The Latin word, esse, is notoriously diﬃcult to render in English in a way that preserves its original
meaning. The inﬁnitive form of the verb ‘ to be ’, esse is used by many medieval scholars (including
Aquinas) to indicate the ‘ act of existing ’ an actual being possesses, where this diﬀers from that thing’s
essence. Someone could meaningfully describe the essence of a human being (or a hamster), even if no
such animal existed at that moment in time. A thing’s actuated essence – its existence – is its ‘ esse ’.
41. ‘ Manifestum est enim quod materiae et formae unum est esse : non enim materia habet esse in actu nisi
per formam … . Anima vero rationalis, manifestum est quod excedit materiam in operari : habet enim
aliquam operationem absque participatione organi corporalis, scilicet intelligere. Unde et esse suum
non est solum in concretione ad materiam. Esse igitur eius, quod erat compositi, manet in ipsa corpore
dissoluto : et reparato copore in resurrectione, in idem esse reducitur quod remansit in anima ’ (4156).
42. I can’t hope to defend here Aquinas’s claim that the human soul can exist in separation from matter.
I think, however, that Eleonore Stump is right in claiming that (1) Aquinas is a sort of non-reductionist
materialist, and that (2) non-reductive materialism might create the logical space necessary for a
subsistent soul; Stump ‘ Non-Cartesian substance dualism and materialism without reductionism ’. See
also Richard Boyd ‘ Materialism without reductionism : what physicalism does not entail ’, in N. Block
(ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press, 1980).
43. This, I take it, is the main force of the arguments Aquinas makes in SCG, IV.81 on behalf of the
continuity of the essential principles of the human being. For a defence of this claim in more
contemporary terms, see Eleonore Stump’s discussion of Aquinas’s account of identity post-death and
the continuity of a conﬁgured conﬁgurer in Aquinas, chs 1 and 4 ; see also Robert Pasnau’s discussions of
this topic in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature.
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44. Again, it’s crucial for Aquinas’s explanation of post-resurrection identity that David’s esse continues after
his death, preserved by his soul. This is what allows Aquinas to claim that David’s resurrected self
constitutes a diﬀerent stage of the same life, rather than constituting the beginning of a new person
who’s qualitatively identical to David.
45. See Van Inwagen ‘ The possibility of resurrection ’, and Zimmerman ‘ The compatibility of materialism
and survival ’.
46. Earlier drafts of this paper were read at the Cornell Colloquium in Mediaeval Philosophy, St Louis
University, and the University of Akron, and I owe those audiences my thanks for their helpful
comments. I am especially grateful to the Philosophy Department at Calvin College for their feedback, to
Scott MacDonald for his comments on various stages of this paper, and to Justin Kincaid for working
through the ﬁnal formatting issues.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412507009031 Published online by Cambridge University Press

